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Abstract: In this article, I argue that intentional psychology (i.e. the interpretation of human 
behaviour in terms of intentional states and propositional attitudes) plays an essential role in 
the sciences of the mind. However, this role is not one of identifying scientifically respectable 
states of the world. Rather, I argue that intentional psychology acts as a type of 
phenomenological model, as opposed to a mechanistic one. I demonstrate that, like other 
phenomenological models in science, intentional psychology is a methodological tool with its 
own benefits and insights that complements our mechanistic understanding of systems. As a 
result, intentional psychology’s distinctive scientific benefit is its ability to model systems in 
unique, non-mechanistic, ways. This allows us to generate predictions that we cannot otherwise 
generate using the mechanistic models of neuroscience and cognitive psychology necessary for 
various scientific tasks.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Intentional psychology, sometimes called ‘folk’ psychology, is the interpretation and explanation of 
human behaviour in terms of the attribution of intentional states or propositional attitudes, such as 
beliefs, desires and intentions (as well as other mental representations). Some argue that as a scientific 
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explanation of human behaviour, intentional psychology ought to be replaced by more capable scientific 
theories from domains such as neuroscience and neurophysiology (Churchland 1981; Stich 1983; 
Ramsey, Stich, and Garon 1990, and more recently Bickle 2003). Others argue that it is essential to 
understand human cognition in virtue of identifying internal causal states of systems (most famously 
Fodor 1975, 1987, 2008, but see also Putnam 1967 and Field 1978). In this article, I demonstrate that 
intentional psychology is essential to our understanding of human cognition, but not in virtue of 
identifying scientifically respectable states of the world. Instead, I propose a characterization of 
intentional psychology as a phenomenological model, and demonstrate that it is an indispensable 
complement to the mechanistic explanations of behaviour provided by neuroscience and 
neurophysiology. 
Phenomenological models are commonly used in science to generate predictions, as well as 
perform other tasks, that cannot be accomplished using mechanistic models which identify the structure 
and causal features of systems. By analogy, intentional descriptions work in conjunction with 
mechanistic descriptions in our scientific study of the mind, each with a different scientific burden to 
bear. Both mechanistic and phenomenological models have an integral role to play in scientific inquiry, 
and neither can be eliminated from scientific methodology in favour of the other. 
In the next section, I provide an outline of the distinction between mechanistic and 
phenomenological models in science. In Section 3, I provide a brief sketch of the arguments traditionally 
raised against the scientific merits of intentional psychology, and show how interpreting it as a 
phenomenological model overcomes these arguments. Finally, in Section 4, I demonstrate that 
intentional psychology, understood in this way, is an essential tool in our scientific study of the mind. It 
is neither threatened by, nor an extension of, our mechanistic accounts of human behaviour. Instead, 
like other phenomenological models in science, it is a methodological tool with its own benefits 
and insights that complements our mechanistic interpretations of systems. 
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2. Mechanistic models versus phenomenological models 
 
2.1. Mechanistic models 
 
Models serve a variety of purposes within science, from hypothesis testing to analyzing data. One critical 
purpose of models, however, is to provide explanations. The sorts of models we use to provide 
explanations often depends on the sorts of questions that we are interested in answering, and the 
scientific domain in which we are working. When trying to provide explanations in scientific disciplines 
pertaining to the mind – disciplines such as neuroscience, cognitive science and cognitive psychology – 
the type of model typically considered ideal for explanations is a mechanistic model (Machamer, 
Darden, and Craver 2000; Bechtel 2005, 2008; Glennan 2005; Craver 2006; Wimsatt 2007; Thagard 2009, 
2012; Eliasmith 2010). Mechanistic models provide explanations by demonstrating how objects within a 
system interact so as to produce some phenomenon. A rather straightforward example, offered by 
Machamer et al. (2000, p. 3), is the phenomenon of chemical neurotransmission: 
 
in the [case] of chemical neurotransmission, a presynaptic neuron transmits a signal to a 
postsynaptic neuron by releasing neurotransmitter molecules that diffuse across the synaptic 
cleft, bind to receptors, and so depolarize the post-synaptic cell.  
 
In order to provide a complete explanation of chemical neurotransmission, we must understand the 
various aspects of the mechanism that produces it. First and foremost, we must identify the entities 
involved in the production of the phenomenon. In this case, the entities would be the presynaptic 
neuron, the post-synaptic neuron, the neurotransmitter molecules, the receptors and the post-synaptic 
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cell. Similarly, we must identify how these entities are situated spatially and temporally within the 
mechanism. This includes identifying the ‘relative locations, shapes, sizes, orientations, connections, and 
boundaries of the mechanisms components’ (Craver and Bechtel 2006, p. 470). The way in which the 
parts are structured and placed within the mechanism determines how they can interact with one 
another in order to produce the relevant phenomenon.  
Next, we must identify how the different parts work together. In the above example, the 
presynaptic neuron transmits a signal by releasing neurotransmitter molecules. These molecules diffuse 
across the synaptic cleft and bind to receptors, depolarising the post-synaptic cell. These interactions 
bring about the phenomenon we are trying to explain (the neurotransmission of chemicals). 
A mechanistic model is, therefore, explanatory when it identifies four major components: The 
phenomenon (the thing in need of explaining), the parts (the relevant components within the system), 
the organization (the relevant way in which the parts are situated spatially and temporally within the 
system) and the activities (the interactions and processes that go on between the component parts in 
order to produce the phenomenon). By identifying these four components, mechanistic models can 
explain how the phenomenon is being produced by the system. With this rough sketch of mechanistic 
models in hand, we now have a general set of criteria with which to distinguish mechanistic models 
from non-mechanistic ones. 
 
2.2. Phenomenological models 
 
Providing mechanistic explanations is a common goal in the behavioural sciences, but it is not the only 
goal. We use non-mechanistic models for a variety of different purposes in the sciences of the mind. 
They can describe phenomena in need of explanation, measure or calculate crucial quantities, make 
predictions, summarize data and function as heuristics for designing experiments (Bogen 2005, p. 401; 
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Craver 2006, p. 355). Such models primarily characterize or describe some phenomenon without 
attempting to decompose it into parts and operations for better understanding. These 
phenomenological models play an important role in science different from their mechanistic cousins. 
Consider Hodgkin and Huxley’s mathematical model of the action potential in the squid giant axon: 
 
[This] model is derived in part from the laws of physics and chemistry, such as Ohm’s law, 
Coulomb’s law and the Nernst equation, and it can be used to derive myriad electrical features 
of many different kinds of neurons in many different species. Despite this accomplishment, the 
authors insist that their model is not an explanation. (Craver 2006, p. 356) 
 
Despite the appearance of a mechanistic explanation, Hodgkin and Huxley’s model makes no ontological 
commitments about the underlying mechanisms that produce the time course of the action potential in 
the squid giant axon. It merely characterises and predicts important electrical features of those neurons. 
Despite not being explanatory in the way many scientists studying the mind are interested in, the model 
has proven extremely important and predictive. Identifying mathematical dependencies is extremely 
beneficial, even if it does not mechanistically explain the phenomenon it describes. As another example, 
consider the use of a specific form of dynamic systems theory in cognitive science: 
 
What came to be called dynamical systems theory (DST) enables investigators to visualize the 
change in the state of a system over time. The simplest case is a plot of the states traversed by a 
system through time, that is, the system’s trajectory through state space. Each dimension of 
state space corresponds to one variable of the system, and each point in the space corresponds 
to one of the possible states of the system. (Bechtel 2008, p. 187) 
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By applying the appropriate set of differential equations, we can predict the trajectory of the system 
through this state space. Dynamical models have been used in cognitive science to describe and predict 
cognitive phenomena like the production of speech (Port 2003) and the movement of animals (Kelso 
1995). What is important to note about such models, however, is that they often characterise and 
predict the behaviour of cognitive systems without appealing to underlying causal mechanisms. Instead, 
it is ‘usually only observable behaviour [that] is mapped to the model’ (Eliasmith 2010, p. 319). In this 
respect, these dynamical models act as phenomenological models, providing no mechanistic explanation 
for the behaviour of the system. Despite this, such models have played a significant role in our scientific 
study of cognitive systems. 
It is also important to note that even though they do not provide mechanistic explanations, 
phenomenological models still provide some degree of explanatory power. Consider what it means to 
explain a mechanistic system: ‘explanations afford the ability to say not merely how the system in fact 
behaves, but to say how it will behave under a variety of interventions’ (Craver 2006, p. 358). The use of 
phenomenological models still allows us to determine a limited range of counterfactual behaviours in 
virtue of being predictively adequate. In this respect, such models can provide us with limited 
explanations, even in contexts where they do not match the explanatory power provided by mechanistic 
models. 
 
3. The role of intentional psychology in the behavioural sciences 
 
3.1. Reasons to doubt intentional psychology’s scientific merits 
 
A great deal of criticism has been raised over the past few decades regarding the scientific value of 
intentional psychology. Churchland (1981, pp. 68–76), for example, argues that intentional psychology is 
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an explanatorily deficient account of human action. Among the common mental phenomena that 
intentional psychology cannot explain are: mental illness, creative imagination, the nature and function 
of sleep, memory, perceptual illusions and the learning process (Churchland 1981, p. 73). In virtue of 
this, he proposes that it fails as an adequate theory of human action, and should be replaced. 
Similarly, Stich (1983, p. 101) argues that even when intentional psychology works at explaining 
and predicting systems, it fails the moment we apply it to systems in exotic circumstances. The use of 
intentional psychology, for example, can explain and predict the behaviour of people in particular kinds 
of societies, but fails when we apply it to people in radically different types of societies. It therefore 
cannot be relied upon to be a consistent explanatory or predictive tool for scientific purposes. 
A different sort of argument is that the attribution of intentional states to systems is an 
inherently normative practice. Put another way, when we describe a system using intentional 
psychology, we attribute to it a set of intentional states that we feel it ought to have if it were a rational 
agent in that scenario. This means that ‘an element of interpretation, and dramatic interpretation at 
that, must be recognized in any use of the intentional vocabulary’ (Dennett 1987, p. 342). As a result, 
attributions are not made based on any empirical facts about the structure of the system, since the 
same physical system can always be interpreted as having vastly different sets of intentional states (e.g. 
different sets of beliefs, desires, goals, etc.) that will be compatible with its behaviour. Thus a physical 
description of a system will always be compatible with numerous different intentional interpretations. 
Given this normative and interpretative feature of intentional descriptions, intentional psychology 
appears ill-suited to play a role in the empirical sciences that work explicitly with physical descriptions. 
Quine (1960, p. 218) seems to have this in mind when he tells us that ‘the underlying methodology of 
the idioms of propositional attitudes contrasts strikingly with the spirit of objective science at its most 
representative’. 
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Finally, it is questioned whether we need intentional attributions in science at all. In the past, it 
was common for people to attribute intentional states to natural phenomena such as the wind, fire, 
rivers and mountains (Dennett 1969, p. 89; Churchland 1981, p. 74); yet, over time we have learned to 
easily and conveniently predict such phenomena far better and more accurately without such 
intentional terminology. A completed neuroscience may very well allow us to do the same when 
predicting human action (Churchland 1981; Stich 1983; Ramsey et al. 1990; Bickle 2003). So, how might 
intentional idioms be critical to scientific progress? 
 
3.2. Intentional psychology as a phenomenological model 
 
The first thing to note about intentional psychology is that it tells us very little about the underlying 
structure of systems. To speak of a system in terms of its beliefs or its mental representations does not 
tell us what mechanisms are generating its behaviour. As Dennett (1987, p. 48) notes, ‘we find that we 
all use [intentional] psychology knowing next to nothing about what actually happens inside people’s 
skulls’. But while intentional psychology may not identify structural features of systems, it can be 
remarkably good at predicting systems (Dennett 1971, 1987, 1991; Churchland 1981, pp. 72–73; Fodor 
1987, p. 3; Clark 1988; Lahav 1992; Cummins 2000, p. 131; Bechtel 2007, p. 194). This means that our 
use of intentional psychology to predict systems does not require that we adopt any ontological 
commitments about the structure of the system we are predicting: 
 
[D]eciding on the basis of available evidence that something is (to be treated as) an Intentional 
system permits predictions having a normative or logical basis rather than an empirical one, and 
hence the success of an Intentional prediction, based as it is on no particular picture of the 
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system’s design, cannot be construed to confirm or disconfirm any particular pictures of the 
system’s design. (Dennett 1971, p. 97) 
 
Intentional psychology interprets and predicts the phenomenon of human action without providing a 
mechanistic explanation for it. This is exactly what phenomenological models do: ‘They are complete 
black boxes: they reveal nothing about the underlying mechanisms and so merely ‘save the 
phenomenon’ to be explained’ (Craver 2006, p. 360). 
But if intentional psychology functions as a phenomenological model, then this would imply that 
intentional descriptions are not the sort of explanations that scientists studying the mind commonly 
seek, since they do not describe causal mechanisms. Yet, intentional states seem to be invoked in our 
explanations of human action all the time. I can explain Jane’s absence from my party due to her being 
angry with me. Similarly, I might explain why my dog barked at a quick moving shadow in terms of his 
believing the shadow was an animal. In these cases, intentional descriptions play a large role in our 
explanations. Thus it appears, at least prima facie, that we do not treat intentional psychology as a type 
of phenomenological model. 
I propose that this is not, in fact, a problem for the account I provide. Intentional psychology still 
provides us with limited explanations when searching for mechanisms, in exactly the same way 
phenomenological models provide us with a degree of explanatory power: 
 
Because phenomenal models summarize the phenomenon to be explained, they typically allow 
one to answer some [‘what-if-things-had-been-different’]-questions. But [a more complete] 
explanation shows why the relations are as they are in the phenomenal model, and so reveals 
conditions under which those relations might change or fail to hold altogether. (Craver 2006, p. 
358) 
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We see just this sort of thing when talking in terms of intentional states. To explain my dog’s behaviour 
in terms of his beliefs does not show why his beliefs are as they are. Nor does it reveal how or why those 
beliefs change or cease to exist under different circumstances. But in virtue of being predictive, it allows 
us to explain in a limited fashion. In order to provide a more complete explanation of his behaviour, 
however, we must understand the internal neurological mechanisms that causally produce the 
regularities in behaviour that we describe in terms of intentional states. Intentional psychology identifies 
regularities in the system’s interactions in the world (Dennett 1991; Bechtel 2007, p. 194), but does not 
describe the underlying structure of the system that produces them. 
 
3.3. Responses to objections and criticisms 
 
Given the limited explanatory power of phenomenological models in the life sciences, Churchland’s 
objection to intentional psychology on the grounds that it lacks explanatory power loses some of its 
sting. The fact that intentional attributions cannot explain a number of mental phenomena is not 
grounds for elimination, since phenomenological models are often not used to provide such 
explanations. 
Even though an intentional model posits mental states and objects that may not be 
neurologically plausible, this does not damage its usefulness as a predictive model. As Craver (2006, p. 
361) tells us, ‘for those who merely want to predict the target system’s performance, biologically 
implausible simulations will work just fine’. It is only when we go in search of mechanistic explanations 
that such models become insufficient. 
Viewing intentional psychology as a phenomenological model allows us to avoid other criticisms 
levelled against it as well. Consider Stich’s criticism that intentional psychology fails as a predictive 
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model since it cannot be used to accurately predict a system in unusual situations. This limitation on 
applicability is not, in fact, a sign that intentional psychology fails as a useful scientific tool. On the 
contrary, this is a rather common characteristic of phenomenological models. Given that such models 
abstract away all the structural details of the system being modelled, they will often only be useful 
within a constrained set of situations: 
 
One might, for example, build a model that is useful only within a narrow range of conditions 
(such as health, proper functioning or the absence of disturbing outside forces), but that fails 
outside of those narrow conditions. For example, one might provide a model of verb-tense 
generation that performs perfectly well when the brain and vocal cords are working properly, 
but that provides no insight into how the system will behave if something breaks or if the 
system is in extreme environmental conditions. (Craver 2006, p. 357) 
 
As a phenomenological model, intentional attributions will work extremely well in particular 
sorts of environments and situations, just not others. This is not a sufficient reason for elimination, 
however, or else we would have to throw out all phenomenological models in science. 
As for the objection that intentional psychology is inherently normative and thus inappropriate 
for use in empirical scientific practice, this assumes that the only types of descriptions that belong in our 
rigorous scientific study of the mind are those that explicitly identify the structure and causal 
interactions of systems. But this is simply untrue. Even if we grant that such descriptions are the sorts of 
descriptions we are searching for when explaining mental phenomena, this does not imply that only 
such descriptions are relevant to scientific inquiry involving the mind. If it did, then statistical models 
would be equally banished from our scientific methodology, since they too do not describe the physical 
constitution and causal interactions of systems. Instead, such models only ‘focus on describing the 
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regularities in the data’ that we collect about a given system, and so ‘are silent with respect to the 
particular physical implementation’ (Eliasmith 2010, p. 315). In this regard, they too involve an element 
of interpretation. Yet, such models have an undeniably crucial role in our scientific methodology. The 
normative aspect of intentional descriptions does not change the fact that intentional models are 
predictive. And it is qua predictive model that such descriptions are important to our scientific 
methodology, not qua empirical/normative model (as is the case with statistical models). 
In fact, intentional characterisations bear a family resemblance to statistical characterisations. 
Both act as a type of phenomenological model. Phenomenological models come in all shapes and sizes 
after all. Certain types of dynamical models, as we saw, act as phenomenological models. Statistical 
models, meanwhile, act as different sorts of phenomenological models. Unlike dynamical models, 
statistical models predict by describing ‘the probability of various measureable states of the system 
given other known states of the system’ (Eliasmith 2010, p. 315). Similarly, intentional characterizations 
are simply another flavour of phenomenological model. They are relevantly similar to both statistical 
and dynamical models in virtue of remaining agnostic as to the physical implementation of the system 
being described and predicted. However, instead of basing predictions on dynamic systems theory, or 
probability theory, they predict based on the tenets of rationality.1 
                                                          
1
 Some might object to this suggestion of a family resemblance between intentional and statistical models. After 
all, while statistical models are based on the well-defined axioms of probability theory, the axioms of rationality 
(on which intentional attributions seem to be based) are not so apparent. It is questionable whether there even 
are any clearly definable axioms of rationality. When we predict the behaviour of others, we do so without any 
explicit understanding of what such axioms might be. In this respect, intentional models may be too different in 
kind from statistical models to warrant inclusion into the class of phenomenological models. The problem with this 
sort of objection is twofold. First, it is a mistake to think that all domains to which statistical models are applied are 
therefore axiomatised. That there are statistical axioms does not mean that any particular statistical model (e.g. of 
stock markets) is also axiomatised in the relevant respect. We do not, for instance, have the axioms of stock 
market behaviour just because we have a statistical model of the stock markets. You could, after all, have a 
statistical model of rationality. Second, and more importantly, this sort of objection is a red-herring. Even if we 
assume that there are no explicit axioms of rationality (which is still up for debate), it is hardly a necessary 
characteristic of phenomenological models that they be based on axioms. That was never the claim. Intentional 
models are, however, relevantly like statistical models in key respects: First, they are predictively valuable in 
scientific practice. Second, they make predictions without telling us structural or mechanistic details of the system. 
Third, they are often used to identify patterns and regularities in behaviour produced by mechanistic systems. 
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The fact that various types of phenomenological models predict in different ways means that 
each is useful in different contexts (Eliasmith 2010). The lack of explicit quantification makes intentional 
models ideal for predictions in contexts where quantification is either not possible, or difficult to 
determine. This makes them ideal for situations where statistical and dynamical models are unavailable 
and/or uninformative. Intentional models allow us to make predictions without having to quantify over 
features of the system that we may not know how to measure. In this regard, intentional models have 
their place among the ranks of other phenomenological models with their own role and benefits. 
 
4. Why settle for the phenomenological? 
 
Even if we grant that intentional psychology can be characterised as a phenomenological model, the 
preceding discussion does seem to be dancing around the main issue: If a mechanistic model of human 
action is available to us through neuroscience or neurophysiology, do we really need intentional 
psychology for scientific predictions? In this section, I argue that the mechanistic models found in these 
domains are insufficient to fill the scientific role played by an intentional model. 
 
4.1. Phenomenological models can generate predictions that mechanistic models cannot 
 
If we view models as scientific tools, then different tools may be necessary for different tasks and the 
model that is best for explanations will not necessarily be the best for predictions. And indeed, there are 
clear cases where phenomenological models outperform their mechanistic counterparts when it comes 
to predictions. Consider, for example, two different ways of modelling the behaviour of water. One 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Finally, they are used in conjunction with mechanistic models to provide more complete understandings of 
systems. These similarities provide us with compelling reasons to consider intentional characterisations as a 
species of phenomenological model, just as statistical models are. 
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which models water based on its atomic constituents and how they causally interact to produce 
behaviour, and the other which says nothing about the mechanisms responsible for the behaviour and 
only describes behavioural regularities: 
 
If one is studying diffusion or Brownian motion, one adopts a molecular perspective in which 
water is regarded as a collection of particles. [. . .] However, if one’s concern is the behavior of 
water flowing through pipes, the best-fitting models are generated within a perspective that 
models water as a continuous fluid. Thus, one’s theoretical perspective on the nature of water 
depends on the kind of problem one faces. Employing a plurality of perspectives has a solid 
pragmatic justification. There are different problems to be solved, and neither perspective by 
itself provides adequate resources for solving all the problems. (Giere 2006, p. 34) 
 
In the case of water’s movement through pipes, the use of a phenomenological model allows us to 
predict and describe the behaviour of water better than the mechanistic model. The model that is best 
for explaining why water moves (in terms of molecular motion) is not necessarily the ideal model for 
predictions. Similarly, there are compelling reasons to think that intentional models are better suited to 
certain scientific tasks than the mechanistic models we use in our neurological and physiological 
explanations. 
To demonstrate, consider the stagnation in the neuroscience of vision that took place in the 
1960s and 1970s. According to Marr, a strictly mechanistic understanding of vision proved unfruitful 
until neuroscientists realised the need to adopt a different perspective about the system, and what it 
was doing. More specifically, the neuroscience of vision was only able to proceed when neuroscientists 
began attributing intentional content to neurological mechanisms (Marr 1982; Bechtel 2008, pp. 24–28). 
Certain neurons, for example, were found to contain visual information about the edges and boundaries 
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of seen objects. This information, according to Marr (1982, p. 19), needed to be ‘analyzed and 
understood in a way that [was] independent of the particular mechanisms and structures that 
implement them in our head’. And as Dennett (1971, p. 90) rightly points out, the ‘possession of 
information or misinformation is just as Intentional a notion as that of belief’. Only by taking an 
intentional interpretation of the system, and attributing intentional content to neurological mechanisms 
could we proceed in making essential predictions. In this regard, intentional models go hand-in-hand 
with mechanistic models in our best scientific practice, each contributing to the study of the mind in 
ways the other is not well suited for. 
 
4.2. Phenomenological models are necessary for generating mechanistic models 
 
Despite not explicitly describing mechanisms, intentional psychological descriptions are an essential tool 
in our scientific discovery and understanding of mechanisms. One of the primary uses of 
phenomenological models is precisely in helping to construct mechanistic ones. According to Bogen 
(2005, p. 401), phenomenological models are often used to ‘suggest and sharpen questions about causal 
mechanisms’, ‘suggest constraints on acceptable explanations’ and ‘support inductive inferences 
without which mechanisms could not be successfully studied’. In a similar vein, the attribution of 
intentional states to systems allows us to better understand ‘the task being performed by the [. . .] 
system, why it needs to be performed, and the constraints the task itself places on how it is performed’ 
(Bechtel 2008, p. 26). This provides us with insights into the physical implementation of the system 
being described. 
With this in mind, Bechtel points out that there are two methods of intervening in a mechanistic 
system in order to learn about it. One involves going inside the system and altering the relevant parts 
and operations to see what results. The other involves altering only the environmental conditions in 
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which the system is placed, and observing the regularities in the overall behaviour caused by those 
environmental changes: 
 
‘Each of these modes of intervention and detection provides different information about mental 
mechanisms. None of them alone provides a direct and complete account; rather, each is partial 
and potentially misleading’ (Bechtel 2008, pp. 38–39). 
 
Describing the spatiotemporal parts and operations working inside a system very often tells us little 
about the possible environmental conditions in which the mechanism will be placed, and so cannot tell 
us the behavioural regularities of entire systems in different environmental situations: 
 
The behaviour an entity exhibits is often dependent upon context and there is no reason to 
think that the account of an entity offered by any inquiry considers how it will behave under all 
conditions but only those which are the focus of inquiry. As engineers are well aware, how a 
component will behave when inserted into a particular kind of system often needs to be 
investigated empirically. (Bechtel 2008, p. 22) 
Meanwhile, it is the very purpose of intentional models to characterise how entire systems behave in 
various sorts of situations and environments, and to identify behavioural regularities. According to 
Bechtel (2007, p. 10), intentional psychology ‘characterises regularities in the way cognitive agents 
respond to situations arising in their environment’. A similar point is made by Dennett (1987, p. 257), 
who claims that intentional psychology ‘is well-suited to describe, in predictive, fruitful and illuminating 
ways, the cognitive prowess of creatures in their environments’. The lesson to take away from this is 
that descriptions in terms of objects and operations must be supplemented by intentional descriptions 
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since both provide insights that the other lacks, and both play a key role in explaining and learning about 
mechanistic systems. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that intentional psychology is best understood as playing the role of a phenomenological 
model in our scientific study of the mind. Those who strive for a reductive or eliminative account of 
intentional concepts within science must be cautious. As a predictive tool, intentional attributions may 
play an indispensible role in helping to construct a complete mechanistic explanation of psychology, and 
thus are useful in ways that mechanistic models are not. A plurality of models are useful precisely 
because they do a plurality of things. 
Similarly, even if we supposed that a completed mechanistic model could, in principle, be used 
in place of an intentional one, we rarely abandon useful and predictive models in science simply because 
we think a far more complex and unwieldy model gets the ontology more accurate. We talk about light 
in terms of ‘rays’ when studying optics, even though we do not think this accurately captures the 
ontology of light. We model electricity as though it were a continuous entity with ‘flow’ and ‘current’ 
when modelling electrical circuits, instead of a massive collection of electrons moving along a track (or 
as small clouds of probability as quantum mechanics suggests). We similarly use Newtonian physics in 
many cases instead of the more fundamental and accurate quantum mechanics. In a similar vein, 
intentional psychology (construed as a phenomenological model) has an important scientific role to 
play, and the construction of more detailed mechanistic models will not challenge that. 
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